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To our knowledge, this paper provides the most comprehensive analysis of firm-level corporate income
taxes to date. We use publicly available financial statement information for 11,602 public corporations
from 82 countries from 1988 to 2009 to estimate country-level effective tax rates (ETRs). We find
that the location of a multinational and its subsidiaries substantially affects its worldwide ETR.  Japanese
firms always faced the highest ETRs. U.S. multinationals are among the highest taxed. Multinationals
based in tax havens face the lowest taxes. We find that ETRs have been falling over the last two decades;
however, the ordinal rank from high-tax countries to low-tax countries has changed little. We also
find little difference between the ETRs of multinationals and domestic-only firms. Besides enhancing
our knowledge about international taxes, these findings should provide some empirical underpinning
for ongoing policy debates about the taxation of multinationals.
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1.  Introduction 
This paper exploits recently available financial statement information about non-U.S. 
companies to enhance our understanding of how taxes affect multinationals and to provide some 
empirical underpinnings for the ongoing debates in the Unites States, the United Kingdom, and 
other countries about competition in the market for tax domicile.
1  It is widely accepted among 
American tax practitioners and corporate managers that U.S. domicile results in higher total 
worldwide taxes, new companies anticipating substantial foreign operations should not 
incorporate in the U.S., and companies domiciled outside the U.S. have a tax advantage in the 
market for corporate control (see Samuels, 2009, Carroll, 2010, among many others).  Reasons 
include the U.S.’s use of a worldwide tax system, which diminishes the advantages of operating 
through subsidiaries located in low-tax foreign countries and makes the U.S. somewhat unique 
among its trading partners, limits on the deductibility of some expenses, a relatively restrictive 
controlled foreign corporation (CFC) regime, and aggressive federal tax administration.
2  As 
evidence that other countries dominate the U.S. as a domicile for multinationals and that 
companies currently domiciled in the U.S. would leave if the tax costs of exiting were not 
prohibitive, critics of the current U.S. system point (as one example) to the strong legislation and 
political pressure that were needed to stem the exodus of U.S. companies through inversions 
                                                            
1 By “domicile,” we mean the location of the firm for tax purposes.  There is no standard definition of domicile.  For 
example, domicile is the legal residence or site of incorporation in the U.S., but the location of operational 
headquarters in the UK. 
2 In overly simplistic terms, countries with territorial systems only tax the domestic income of companies domiciled 
in their country.  In contrast, countries with worldwide systems tax all income (domestic and foreign) of their home 
companies and provide foreign tax credits to prevent double taxation of foreign profits.  Timothy McDonald, Vice 
President of Finance and Accounting for Procter & Gamble, likely spoke for many U.S. managers when he called 
the Netherlands, who have a territorial system with few restrictions on the deductibility of expenses related to 
foreign activities, the model system for taxing multinationals (Tuerff, et al., 2008, p.79).  Consistent with American 
companies envying their Dutch competitors, allegedly fewer than five of the 20 largest Dutch companies are paying 
any corporate income tax to the Netherlands (Dohmen, 2008). 2 
 
(reincorporations in low-tax countries with no operational impact), following Stanley Works’ 
highly controversial aborted move to Bermuda in 2002.
3   
However, concerns about domicile competitiveness are not limited to the U.S.  In his 
study of 278 changes in multinational headquarters involving 19 countries from 1997 to 2007, 
Voget (2008) shows that relocating to reduce global taxes is a widespread phenomenon.  Most 
recently, the UK has seen several companies leave for domiciles in tax havens.
4  In fact, the 
Financial Times (September 21, 2008) quoted an anonymous source saying, “As we understand 
it, half the FTSE 100 is looking at this [redomiciling outside the UK.].” (Braithwaite, 2008).
5  
This inability to compete for domicile contributed to the UK’s recent adoption of a territorial 
system of taxing the foreign profits of its multinationals.
6     
                                                            
3 See Desai and Hines (2002) for detailed discussions of the inversions.  Capturing the fiery rhetoric in 2002 
concerning U.S. inversions, Johnston (2002) reported, “Senior senators from both parties used blunt language today 
to denounce companies that use Bermuda as a mail drop to reduce their American income taxes by tens of millions 
of dollars, calling them ‘greedy’ and ‘unpatriotic’ tax evaders whose actions could not be tolerated ‘in a time of 
war’.” In March, 1999, these issues were center stage in a famous exchange during the testimony of Bob Perlman, 
Vice President of Taxes for Intel Corporation, before the Senate Finance Committee.  Perlman stated, “…if I had 
known at Intel's founding (over thirty years ago) what I know today about the international tax rules, I would have 
advised that the parent company be established outside the U.S. This reflects the reality that our Tax Code 
competitively disadvantages multinationals simply because the parent is a U.S. corporation.” (Perlman, 1999).  The 
Senate Finance Committee's ranking Democrat, New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan retorted, "So, you 
would have left the United States for the tax shelters of the Cayman Islands.  Do you think that the Marines are still 
down there if you need them?...So money matters more to you than country?...I am sure you will reconsider it, but if 
you do move, well, just keep in check with the American consul.  You might never know." (United States Senate 
Committee on Finance, 1999, p.17.) 
4 The exodus is not limited to corporate domicile.  Jones and Houlder (2010) report the one-quarter of London’s 
hedge fund employees have recently moved to Switzerland to avoid higher taxes. 
5In 2008, Henderson Group, Charter, Shire, WPP, and the United Business Media, emigrated to Ireland and the 
Regus Group to Luxembourg (Werdigier, 2008 and Faith, 2008), while Kingfisher, Brit Insurance, RSA Insurance, 
and Prudential, among others, threatened to leave (Werdigier, 2008, Braithwaite, 2008).  Colin Meadows, the Chief 
Administrative Officer for Invesco, who moved left the UK for Bermuda in December, 2007, stated “…we wanted 
to make sure the transaction in moving our domicile was tax neutral for our shareholders.  Moving to the U.S. would 
not have been a tax neutral situation. When it came down to it, it was a very short list of places that we considered 
and Bermuda was at the top.” (Neil, 2007).  Decentering also may explain some of the departures (Desai, 2008). 
However, whether the departures are solely or partially tax-driven, the larger and longer-lasting implications for the 
British people may be the newly formed companies that will never have any roots in the UK.  
6 Although UK multinationals widely welcomed the exemption of foreign dividends under a territorial system, some 
question whether it is enough to stifle the exodus.  Ian Brimicombe, head of tax at AstraZeneca, doubted that the 
change in the law would bring back the firms that had already exited the UK and noted that companies with 
intellectual property or finance subsidiaries were still disadvantaged in the UK. (Houlder, 2008).   3 
 
Conversely, scholars have long documented that multinationals are adept at arranging 
their affairs to undo differences in taxation across countries.
7  By shifting income from high-tax 
to low-tax countries through transfer pricing, using hybrid entities that are treated as corporations 
in some countries and flow-through entities in others, stripping profits from high-tax countries 
through intracompany financing, repatriating under favorable tax conditions, and other tax 
avoidance mechanisms, multinationals mitigate the impact of domicile in a high-tax.
8  As a 
recent example,  Bloomberg (October 21, 2010) claims that by routing its offshore rights to 
intellectual property through two Irish subsidiaries, a Dutch subsidiary, and a Bermuda entity, 
Google reduced its total tax rate on foreign profits to 2.4%, saving $3.1 billion over the last three 
years (Drucker, 2010).
9   
Some add that the tax avoidance opportunities that arise from conducting business in 
multiple countries gives multinationals an advantage over their domestic-only counterparts.
10  
With regards to any possible domicile disadvantages that U.S. multinationals might face, 
Stephen Shay, the deputy assistant secretary for international tax affairs at the U.S. Treasury, 
asserts that the size of the U.S. domestic market and the fact that other countries with smaller 
                                                            
7 See Blouin and Krull (2009), Huizinga and Laeven (2008), Desai, et al (2006), Gordon and Hines (2002), 
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001), Collins and Shackelford (1997), among many others, over the last two decades. 
8 Consistent with U.S. multinationals’ exploiting their ability to report profits in locations with more favorable tax 
systems than the U.S., the foreign affiliates of American companies reported more of their aggregate net income in 
the Netherlands (13%), Luxembourg (8%), and Bermuda (8%) than any country in 2006 
(http://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdop.htm).  Other locations with profits that far exceeded assets, sales and 
employees were Ireland (7%), Switzerland (6%), Singapore (4%), and UK islands in the Caribbean (3%).  For 
comparison, 7% of the aggregate net income of U.S. foreign affiliates was reported to Canada (the U.S. largest 
trading partner) and the UK, while only 2% was reported in high-tax Japan and Germany.   
9 Although we cannot verify these figures, a casual review of Google’s financial statements suggests that they pay 
substantially less on their foreign profits that would be expected, given their presence in many relatively high-tax 
countries. 
10 For example, after the HM Revenue and Customs National Audit Office (2007) reported that a third of the UK’s 
700 largest companies paid no tax in the 2005-2006 financial year, Bill Dodwell of Deloitte stated, “That 700 of the 
largest companies and groups are only paying 54 per cent of corporation tax shows the giant contribution of small 
companies.  It is probably because many are less international and so have different planning opportunities.” 
(Houlder, 2007).  Referring to U.S. multinationals, Johnston (2008) adds “…very few grasp how corporate taxes 
favor multinationals over domestic firms.” 4 
 
economies have to rely more on cross-border trading renders the U.S. unique and incomparable 
with other countries, thus justifying differences in the U.S. taxation of multinationals (Coder, 
2010).   In effect, he argues that the economic advantages of the U.S. market offset any tax 
disadvantages associated with U.S. domicile.   
As a result of these conflicting perspectives about whether multinationals are overtaxed 
or undertaxed, it is an empirical issue whether domicile substantially affects a multinational’s 
total worldwide taxes.
11  To shed light on this question, we use firm-level financial statement 
information to estimate the extent to which the location of a firm’s operations affects its global 
corporate income taxes.
12  We measure corporate income taxes by estimating country-level 
effective tax rates (ETRs).  In particular, we regress firm-level ETRs (based on cash taxes paid 
and current and total tax expense as reported in firms’ financial statements) for 28,343 firm-years 
spanning 82 countries on categorical variables for the domicile of the parent and whether the 
company is a multinational.  The regression coefficients on the categorical variables provide 
estimates of country-level ETRs for both domestic firms (those operating in only one country) 
and multinationals.  Besides comparing multinational ETRs across domiciles, we test whether 
domestics and multinationals face similar ETRs and how ETRs vary over time and across 
                                                            
11 The tax domicile debate entered the U.S. Presidential debate on September 26, 2008, when Republican 
Presidential candidate Senator John McCain stated, “Right now, American business pays the second-highest 
business taxes in the world, 35 percent. Ireland pays 11 percent.  Now, if you're a business person, and you can 
locate any place in the world, then, obviously, if you go to the country where it's 11 percent tax versus 35 percent, 
you're going to be able to create jobs, increase your business, make more investment, et cetera.  I want to cut that 
business tax. I want to cut it so that businesses will remain in—in the United States of America and create jobs.”  
His opponent, then-Senator Barack Obama, countered, “Now, John mentioned the fact that business taxes on paper 
are high in this country, and he's absolutely right. Here's the problem: There are so many loopholes that have been 
written into the tax code, oftentimes with support of Senator McCain, that we actually see our businesses pay 
effectively one of the lowest tax rates in the world.” 
12 Ideally, companies would be randomly assigned to countries and permitted time to rearrange their accounting, 
legal, investing, financing, production, marketing, and other activities in light of the tax particulars of their assigned 
country.  We would then compare the global taxes for each company, recognizing that their international tax 
planning acumen might enable the companies assigned to high-tax countries to undo any tax disadvantages.  
Unfortunately, such experiments are impossible.  Thus, we are relegated to examining the actual taxes paid (as 
estimated using financial statement disclosures) by multinationals domiciled in countries for non-random reasons, 
which we can only partially control for in our tests. 5 
 
industries.  We then add categorical variables that denote the location of the firm’s foreign 
subsidiaries, enabling us to estimate the marginal ETR impact for every domicile of foreign 
subsidiaries, including tax havens.   
The principal finding from the study is that domicile substantially affects multinationals’ 
ETRs.  Even though many firms reportedly engage in increasingly aggressive international tax 
planning with transfer pricing, hybrid entities and other tax avoidance strategies, they apparently 
are unable to completely undo the differences in tax law across countries.  Consequently, many 
countries continue to collect large sums of corporate income taxes from multinationals even 
though tax havens and other low-tax countries exist.  In fact, we find that the ETRs for 
multinationals in high-tax countries roughly double those in low-tax countries.  In particular, 
multinationals domiciled in Japan face the highest ETRs, followed by those domiciled in the 
U.S., France and Germany.  Multinationals domiciled in tax havens usually enjoy the lowest 
ETRs.  In some countries, multinationals face higher ETRs than their domestic counterparts; in 
others, multinationals face lower ETRs.  There is no global pattern.   
Furthermore, we find that, although ETRs have steadily declined worldwide over the last 
two decades (most notably in Japan), the ordinal rank from high-tax countries to low-tax 
countries has changed little.  Furthermore, ETRs vary widely across industries throughout the 
world with retailers and construction typically facing ETRs much higher than those of miners 
and information firms.  However, the variation is similar across countries. In almost all countries, 
the same industries are high-tax and low-tax, and high-tax countries tend to tax all industries 
more heavily than low-tax countries do.  We also find the ETR for a multinational is greater if its 
subsidiaries are located in high-tax countries than if its subsidiaries are located in low-tax 
countries.  For example, U.S. multinationals can reduce their ETR by locating a subsidiary in a 6 
 
tax haven.  A subsidiary in the Singapore (Ireland) reduces the cash ETR of the typical U.S. 
multinational by 2.0 (1.6) percentage points. 
Data limitations have prevented scholars from estimating the marginal tax cost associated 
with the domicile of multinationals.  An early study, Collins and Shackelford (1995), uses total 
income tax expense to compute ETRs for four countries (Canada, Japan, the UK, and the U.S.) 
and ten years (1982-1991).  Subsequently, Collins and Shackelford (2003) adds Germany and 
estimates ETRs from 1992-1997; however, with data for only eight Japanese firm-years and 36 
German firm-years, they are effectively limited to studying three countries.  In both studies, they 
conclude that the parents of multinationals domiciled in the U.S. and the UK faced similar ETRs, 
both of which exceeded the parent ETRs in Canada.  In neither study did they have information 
about the location of the company’s subsidiaries.  Two other studies compare (total income tax 
expense) ETRs across countries.  Lu and Swenson (2000) and Lee and Swenson (2008) 
document average ETRs for a wide range of countries for 1995-1998 and 2006-2007, 
respectively.  Using the Global Vantage and Compustat Global databases, they calculate country-
level ETRs and use them as a basis for comparison for the Asia-Pacific countries that were the 
focus of their studies.  Neither study separates domestic-only and multinational corporations or 
has information on the location of firms’ subsidiaries.  As a result, inferences in both studies are 
limited to cross-country comparisons at the aggregate and industry levels.   
Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) exploit text-searching software to collect foreign operations 
information for all U.S.-incorporated firms in the Compustat database between 1995 and 2007 
and estimate the average worldwide, federal, and foreign tax rates on U.S. pre-tax income.  Their 
estimate of a 1.5 percentage point reduction in ETRs for U.S. companies that have activities in a 7 
 
tax haven is comparable with our haven estimates.  A limitation of their study is that they do not 
have access to data for companies domiciled outside the U.S.     
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the regression 
equation used to estimate the ETRs.  Section 3 details the sample selection.  Sections 4, 5, and 6 
present the empirical findings.  Closing remarks follow. 
 
2.  Regression Equation 
To compare the tax rates of multinationals and domestic firms across countries and to 
determine whether multinationals and domestics in the same country face different tax rates, we 
could simply use the actual firm-level ETRs.  However, erroneous inferences about the level of 
taxation across countries could be reached because companies are not randomly assigned across 
countries.  For example, if the technology sector faces relatively low taxes throughout the world 
because of tax incentives for research, then countries with disproportionately large number of 
technology firms might appear to enjoy lower levels of taxation than other countries when the 
difference actually arises because of the industry mix.  Therefore, to control for such possible 
industry, year, and firm size differences across countries, we estimate a modified version of the 
pooled, cross-sectional regression equation developed in Collins and Shackelford (1995):
13 
                       
                    
  ∗        
															                 
               
              
       												 1  
 
where:          the effective tax rate for firm i in year t. 
                                                            
13 Collins and Shackelford’s (1995) regression model includes categorical variables indicating whether the firm’s 
income statement is consolidated or restated in accordance with U.S. GAAP.  We exclude all unconsolidated firm-
years from our sample to avoid potentially including both parents and their subsidiaries as separate observations.  
We cannot include the restatement variable because our data do not include it. 8 
 
            
    an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i is domiciled in country j in year 
t, equal to 0 otherwise. 
         an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i has a foreign subsidiary in year 
t, equal to 0 otherwise. 
             
    an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i is identified as being in 
industry k (by two-digit NAICS) in year t, equal to 0 otherwise. 
        
    an indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years for which t = m, equal to 
0 otherwise. 
        
    the percentile rank of the size of variable n for firm i in year t. 
n={Assets, Revenue, Owners’ Equity}. 
We suppress the intercept so that the coefficients on the COUNTRY variables can be 
interpreted as the marginal cost of domiciling in a country, i.e., the effective tax rate for domestic 
firms.
14  Throughout the paper, we refer to the coefficient on the COUNTRY variable as the 
domestic ETR.  Suppressing the intercept also means that the coefficient on the COUNTRY*MN 
variables is the incremental tax cost for multinationals (as compared with the domestic-only 
firms) in that country.  Positive values are consistent with multinationals in a country facing 
higher ETRs than their domestic counterparts face.  Negative values are consistent with 
domestics in a country facing higher ETRs than their multinational counterparts face.  
Throughout the paper, we refer to the sum of the coefficients on the COUNTRY and the 
COUNTRY * MN variables as the multinational ETR.
15   
                                                            
14 To estimate equation (1), one industry and one year have to be excluded from the regression.  To determine which 
industry to leave out, we calculate the mean ETR in each industry (two-digit NAICS) and then determine the median 
of those means.  The industry with the median mean is the one left out.  We implement a similar procedure on the 
years.   
15 Note that the magnitude of the domestic and multinational ETRs cannot be directly compared with the actual 
ETRs from the financial statements, which serve as the dependent variable.  The domestic and multinational ETRs 9 
 
The coefficients on INDUSTRY and YEAR are used to determine whether ETRs vary 
across industries and time.  Three control variables are intended to capture size (SIZE): the 
percentile ranks of Total Assets, Revenues, and Equity.  Prior studies of the impact of size on 
ETRs have been inconclusive.  Rego (2003), Omer et al. (1993), and Zimmerman (1983) find a 
negative relation, consistent with economies of scale and political costs.  Conversely, Armstrong, 
et al. (2010), Jacob (1996), Gupta and Newberry (1997) and Mills (1998) find no relation. 
The ETRs are collected from each firm’s financial statements.
16  The ETR denominator is 
net income before income taxes (NIBT).  Since financial reporting rules vary across countries 
and thus affect the computation of NIBT, we conduct sensitivity tests using total revenues and an 
adjusted net income as denominators.
17  Results are qualitatively the same. 
Three different numerators are used in our ETR computations: (i) actual cash taxes paid 
(cash ETR), (ii) current worldwide income tax expense (current ETR), and (iii) total worldwide 
income tax expense (total ETR).
18  All measures are collected from the company’s publicly 
available financial statements.  Because the focus of this study is on the actual corporate income 
taxes paid, cash ETR is the superior numerator.
19  Unfortunately, not all countries require firms 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
are the tax rates, conditional on industry, year, and size.  That said, our empirical analysis shows that the estimated 
ETRs are very similar to the actual ETRs from the financial statements. 
16 Note that the ETRs in this study are not marginal tax rates, as detailed in Scholes, et al., 2009.  They ignore 
implicit taxes, cannot assess who bears the burden of corporate income taxes, and cannot capture incentives to 
employ new capital (see Fullerton, 1980, and Bradford and Fullerton, 1981, for a discussion of marginal effective 
tax rates). Neither are they the tax rates related to investment decisions developed in Devereux and Griffith (1998) 
and Gordon, et al (2003).  
17 Adjusted net income is intended to add back two key expenses whose accounting rules vary across countries, 
namely depreciation expense and research and development expense.  Using revenues as the denominator goes even 
further and eliminates any cross-country variation in expenses.   
18 See Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), Graham, et al, 2011, Dyreng et al, 2008, and Hanlon (2003), among others, for 
detailed discussions of these three measures, how they are computed, and potential limitations. 
19 One disadvantage of the cash ETR, compared with the current and total ETRs, is that it includes all taxes paid 
during the year regardless of the year in which the income related to those taxes was earned.  For example, cash 
taxes paid could include additional taxes arising from an audit of past years’ tax returns.  Thus, the numerator may 
include taxes related to income from years, other than the current year, while the denominator (book income before 
taxes) is limited to income from the current year.  In contrast, with current income tax expense (which is designed to 
capture the taxes paid in the current year attributable to economic activity during the current year) as the numerator, 
both the numerator and the denominator contain the current year’s economic activities alone.  That said, because our 10 
 
to disclose the actual taxes paid during that year in their financial statements.  Thus, to expand 
our sample, we turn to the current ETR in some tests.  However, it, too, is not a mandatory 
disclosure in all countries.  Thus, to maximize the observations in the study, we also report the 
total ETR.   
 
3.  Sample 
We use two different databases to collect a sample of firms for this study.  To collect 
information about the location of ultimately-owned subsidiaries, we use the Orbis database.
 20  
We include all parents that have at least one subsidiary.
21  We then match these parents to their 
financial statement information in the Compustat databases.  We collect three different tax 
variables: total tax expense, current tax expense, and cash taxes paid.  The main tests in the paper 
use current tax expense, so it is that sample we describe in detail here.  If a firm-year does not 
report current tax expense but does report both total and deferred tax expense, we calculate 
current tax expense as total less deferred.  As a validity check on the data, we delete all 
observations for which the difference between the ETR with total tax expense in the numerator 
and the ETR with the sum of current and deferred tax expense in the numerator is greater than 
one percentage point.
22  We attempt to mitigate the impact of outliers and errors in the data by 
limiting the sample to observations with non-negative ETR less than or equal to 70%.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
estimates are based on a large sample of firm-years, we doubt that any mismatching for the cash ETR affects the 
inferences drawn from this analysis.  Consistent with that expectation, conclusions are qualitatively identical 
whether cash taxes paid, current tax expense, or total tax expense is the numerator.   
20 Bureau van Dijk collects information directly from Annual Reports and other filings.  In addition, it obtains 
information from several information providers, including CFI Online (Ireland), Dun & Bradstreet, Datamonitor, 
Factset, LexisNexis, and Worldbox.   
21 We define an “ultimately-owned” subsidiary as one for which all links in the ownership chain between it and its 
ultimate parent have greater than 50% ownership. 
22 To further reduce concerns about inaccurate data, we eliminate from the sample any country for which more than 
50% of the observations of current tax expense are zero. 11 
 
The Orbis subsidiary measure has one serious flaw.  Orbis only reports the subsidiary 
information as of the most recent updating of the information.
23  We are unable to assess the 
extent to which this data limitation affects the conclusions drawn from this study.  However, to 
mitigate the potential for miscoding the existence and location of foreign subsidiaries, we limit 
the primary tests in this paper to firm-years since 2004.
24  Our logic is that the foreign subsidiary 
coding is correct for 2009, has fewer errors in 2008 than in 2007, and has fewer errors in 2007 
than in 2006, and so forth.  We arbitrarily select the last five years for which we have data as the 
cut-off for our primary tests in the hope that the miscoding is of an acceptable level for these 
most recent years.  In subsequent tests, we present estimated coefficients from separate 
regressions for each year, and in untabulated tests, we estimate one regression that uses all of the 
firm-years.  Conclusions are similar regardless of the sample period.    
Another potential limitation of using Orbis is that it may fail to identify all of the firm’s 
subsidiaries, a potential limitation that we are unable to fully assess.
25  However, it seems 
reasonable that if Orbis were to overlook some subsidiaries that they would be those that are 
smaller, less significant and potentially inactive.  Since we are aggregating all firms into a single 
country-wide ETR, we trust that imperfections in the data will have limited impact on the 
                                                            
23 For example, if a company had no subsidiary in Canada before 2009 (the most recent year in the database) and 
then incorporated a subsidiary in Canada in 2009, we would erroneously treat the company as having had a 
Canadian subsidiary for all years in our sample.  Likewise, if a company had a subsidiary in Canada for all years 
before 2009 and then liquidated the Canadian subsidiary in 2008, we would erroneously treat the company as not 
having had a subsidiary in Canada for any year in our sample.   
24 Another advantage of limiting the analysis to recent years is that it mitigates potential survivorship bias.  The 
Orbis database is limited to companies presently in existence.  Thus, our analysis is limited to firms that have 
survived throughout the investigation period.  By restricting the sample to firm-years since 2004, we reduce the 
deleterious effects of survivorship bias. 
25 In an attempt to assess the potential magnitude of this problem (at least for U.S. firms), we compare the list of the 
countries that Orbis identifies with the list of countries that Dyreng and Lindsey  (2009) identify using a search of 
the 10-K, Exhibit 21, filed by U.S. multinationals.  Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) list the percentage of U.S. 
multinationals having material operations in each foreign country.  When we calculate that same percentage using 
the Orbis data, we find that our calculated percentage is within 10 percentage points of that of Dyreng and Lindsey 
(2009) for 84 of the 92 countries reported in both studies.  This gives us some assurance that the data are reasonably 
complete, at least for U.S. firms, but the differences indicate that there are imperfections in our data.   12 
 
conclusions.  Nevertheless, despite these possible problems with using Orbis, we use it because 
no other publicly-available database provides as much information about as many firms and 
countries as it does.   
Our sample selection process yields a main sample for the years 2005-2009 of 28,343 
firm-years spanning 82 countries, ranging from only one firm-year in six countries to 9,452 firm-
years in Japan.
26  We combine the countries with fewer than 200 observations into six categories: 
Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, and Tax Havens. The remaining fifteen 
countries are included on their own and our main tests are conducted and results are reported 
using these 21 countries and groups.  For the 21 countries and groups, Table 1 reports the firm-
year means of Sales, Assets, Equity, and Pretax income, dichotomized into 13,917 domestic-only 
firms and 14,426 multinationals.  Not surprisingly, multinational firms average more sales, 
assets, equity, and pretax income than domestics do.   
The next two columns of Table 1 present the mean and median ETRs, respectively, where 
             	   	              	       ⁄ .  These are the actual ETRs from the firms’ 
financial statements, not ETRs estimated from regression analysis.  The domestics 
(multinationals) have mean ETRs of 28% (27%) and median ETRs of 30% (28%).  The final 
column presents the average statutory tax rate for the country-years in the sample.
27  The 
numbers reported are the weighted average rates, where the weighting was done by number of 
firm-years.  In the full sample, domestics and multinationals faced average statutory tax rates of 
39%.   
                                                            
26 An advantage of investigating this period is that it includes both economic expansion (2005-2007) and contraction 
(2008-2009), potentially permitting us to generalize beyond a single phase of the business cycle. 
27 We use the combined corporate statutory tax rate calculated for the 30 OECD countries and available at 
www.oecd.org (Table II.1).  For the non-OECD countries in our sample, we use the maximum rate in data kindly 
provided by Kevin Hassett. 13 
 
In general, the three tax rate columns paint a similar picture.  Countries with high 
statutory tax rates tend to have high ETR.  Two exceptions are Canadian and German domestic 
companies, both of whom have mean current ETRs that are more than 20 percentage points 
lower than their statutory rates, consistent with a high statutory rate but a narrow tax base.  The 
U.S. also has a relatively large spread with the mean current ETR for multinationals 11 
percentage points below the statutory tax rate. 
 
4.  Primary Findings 
4.1. Do the ETRs estimated from the regression coefficients differ from the actual ETRs? 
Table 2 presents the domestic-only ETRs, which are the COUNTRY coefficients from 
estimating equation (1), and the multinational ETRs, which are the sum of the COUNTRY and 
the COUNTRY*MN coefficients.  Results are presented using all three numerators, cash taxes 
paid (cash ETR), current income tax expense (current ETR) and total income tax expense (total 
ETR).   
The actual ETRs from the financial statements (those shown in Table 1) are reported in 
columns immediately to the left of the estimates.
28  There is little difference between the mean of 
the actual ETRs and the estimates from equation (1).  For the six pairings of actual and estimated 
ETRs (domestic cash ETRs, multinational cash ETRs, domestic current ETRs, multinational 
current ETRs, domestic total ETRs and multinational ETRs), the correlation is never less than 
94%.  Furthermore, the difference between the actual ETR and the estimated ETR is never more 
                                                            
28 To illustrate, for Australian companies, using cash taxes paid, the mean raw ETR from the financial statements for 
domestic-only firms is 26%, while the estimated cash ETR for domestics is 23%.  The same figures for 
multinationals are 24% (raw) and 22% (estimated).  The remaining columns are when the numerator is current ETR 
and total ETR, respectively.  14 
 
than six percentage points.
29  Thus, we infer from the similarity between the actual and estimated 
ETRs that the control variables (for industry, year and size) have little impact on the coefficients 
of interest.  This pattern holds throughout the paper, suggesting that the inferences drawn in this 
study would be similar whether we used the actual ETRs from the financial statements or the 
ETRs estimated in the regression.  For brevity, we will focus exclusively on the estimated ETRs 
in the remainder of the paper. 
 
4.2. Do ETRs differ between domestics and multinationals? 
Next, we use Table 2 to compare the estimated ETRs for domestic-only firms with those 
for multinationals.  (Asterisks indicate statistically significant differences between multinational 
and domestic estimates.)  We have enough firm-years to report estimated domestic cash ETRs 
for eight countries or groups of countries (Australia, Canada, Malaysia, UK, U.S., Asia, Europe, 
and Latin America).
30  All estimated domestic cash ETRs for these countries (Table 2, column 2) 
are within five percentage points of their multinational counterparts (Table 2, column 4), and the 
correlation between the two sets of ETRs is 84%.  In three cases, the multinational and domestic 
cash ETRs are significantly different from each other at the 0.05 level: Cash ETRs for Canadian 
multinationals (19%) exceed those for its domestics (14%).  The ETRs for Europe are lower for 
their multinationals (21% vs. 24%).  The U.S. multinational cash ETR estimate is significantly 
                                                            
29 Interestingly, when the numerator is cash taxes paid (current income tax expense), the estimated ETR never (only 
once) exceeds the raw ETR.  The pattern flips when the numerator is total tax expense.  There, the estimated ETR 
exceeds the raw ETR in all, but two, cases.  
30 Although we have enough observations (216) for Japan to report their cash ETRs, we chose to omit them from 
Table 2 because there appear to be errors in the data.  Only 3% of the Japanese companies reporting current tax 
expense also report cash taxes paid.  This suggests that either few companies report cash taxes paid in Japan (and 
they may not be representative of the Japanese population) and/or the data are incomplete or erroneous for this item.  
Either explanation could lead to erroneous inferences about the cash taxes paid by Japanese companies; thus, we err 
on the side of caution.  Such dramatic differences are not found for any other country.   15 
 
greater than the U.S. domestic cash ETR estimate, although by just one percentage point (21% 
vs. 20%).  
As mentioned above, there are more firm-years when current income tax expense or total 
income tax expense are used as the numerator.  This larger number of observations enables us to 
report 17 (20) domestic (multinational) current ETRs and 18 (21) domestic (multinational) total 
ETRs.  The correlation between these domestic ETRs and their multinational counterparts is 73% 
for the current ETRs and 89% for the total ETRs.  The mean of the absolute values of the 
difference between the domestic and the multinational ETRs is three (two) percentage points for 
both current (total) ETRs with no difference exceeding six percentage points.   
Twelve of the 17 countries with both domestic and multinational current ETRs have 
domestic and multinational ETRs that are statistically different from each other.  However, no 
clear directional pattern exists.  In seven cases the multinationals ETR are larger; in five cases 
the domestic ETRs are greater.  A similar split exists among the total ETRs.  Multinational total 
ETRs exceed domestic ones for five countries/groups while domestic total ETRs are larger in six 
cases.  Among U.S. firms, multinationals face a 23% current ETR, while domestics have a 19% 
current ETR, but the total ETRs for U.S. multinationals and domestics are the same (30%).   
We infer from this analysis that although about half of the countries have domestic and 
multinational ETRs that are statistically different from each other, the direction is not consistent 
(i.e., sometimes the domestics have higher ETRs and sometimes the multinationals do).  
Although there are surely cases where transfer pricing, hybrid entities, and other tax plans enable 
multinationals to pay less tax per dollar of profit than domestics do, we do not find evidence to 
support those who claim that multinationals’ consistently pay lower taxes.  Likewise, we find no 
support for contentions that multinationals consistently operate at a tax disadvantage compared 16 
 
with their domestic counterparts because of expense allocations, foreign tax credit limitations, or 
other restrictions that potentially result in taxation both at home and abroad.   
That said, two caveats bear mentioning.  First, these inferences depend critically on the 
data correctly classifying firms as multinational and domestic and, as acknowledged above, the 
data are imperfect.  Second, the decision to operate abroad is endogenous.  It is possible that the 
firms that expand into foreign markets are those with the best ability to avoid the higher tax costs 
that arise from being a multinational. Alternatively, the firms that choose to become 
multinationals may be those with the best ability to exploit the tax advantages arising from being 
able to spread income across multiple countries.  Thus, readers should be cautious in interpreting 
these coefficients as the change in ETRs that would arise if domestics became multinationals or 
multinationals reverted to domestic-only status.    
 
4.3. Does the domicile of a multinational affect its ETR?  
Table 2, column 4 reports estimated multinational cash ETRs for 13 countries, ranging 
from 11% (Middle East) to 22% (Australia, France, Germany, and UK) with mean (median) 
[standard deviation] of 18% (18%) [4%].  The U.S. multinational cash ETR is 21%.  The 20 
estimated multinational current ETRs (column 8) range from 9% for Bermuda (followed by 10% 
for the Cayman Islands and 13% for the Tax Havens) to a high of 31% for Japan (which exceeds 
the next highest, the U.S., by eight percentage points) with mean (median) [standard deviation] 
of 17% (17%) [5%].  The polar countries are the similar when we shift from current to the 
estimated multinational total ETRs (column 12), which range from 16% for Cayman Islands 
(followed by Bermuda at 17% and the Tax Havens at 18%) to 39% for Japan (followed by the 17 
 
U.S. at 30%) with mean (median) [standard deviation] of 24% (25%) [5%].
31  We infer from this 
analysis of cash, current, and total multinational ETRs that the domicile of the multinational 
significantly affects a firm’s ETR.  The estimated ETRs for the highest taxed countries are 
always at least double those for the least heavily taxed countries.  In short, domicile appears to 
matter for multinational corporations. The rank order of the countries holds across ETR 
measures.  
Hereafter, current ETRs alone are reported because they allow us to study more countries 
than would be possible with cash ETRs, and, although total ETRs would enable us to add Africa 
to the analysis, current ETRs better approximate the more desirable, but too often unobservable, 
measure, actual cash taxes paid.
32  In addition, no distinction is made between domestic and 
multinational ETRs because we find no consistent differences between them.   
 
4.4. Have ETRs changed over time? 
The findings above are for firm-years from 2005 to 2009.  By combining years, we 
increase the number of observations per country, enabling us to study more countries.  However, 
by combining years, we may mask cross-temporal changes in tax law.  Thus, we next report 
annual estimated current ETRs, using the complete sample of domestic and multinational firm-
years and modifying equation (1) to allow annual estimates for each country and dropping the 
separate estimates for multinationals (COUNTRY*MN).  These estimated regression coefficients 
enable us to analyze the changes in ETRs from 1988 to 2009 for each country.  By examining 
more than two decades of ETRs, we can see their sensitivity to expansions and recessions.   
                                                            
31 It is not surprisingly that current ETRs are substantially less than total ETRs since deferred tax liabilities usually 
exceed deferred tax assets (see Poterba et al. 2011 and Raedy et al., 2011, among others).   
32 The inferences drawn from using current and total ETRs are identical, as would be expected since the Pearson 
correlation coefficient between the two estimated ETRs is 95%.  The correlation between cash and current (total) 
ETRs is 73% (86%). 18 
 
Table 3 reports the annual estimated current ETRs.  Percentages are only presented if 
there are at least 20 observations, but all available firm-years are included in the regressions.  We 
find that the high-tax to low-tax rank across countries has changed little over the two decades.  In 
1988, the first year for which we have data, the Japanese ETR was the highest at 44% (20 
percentage points ahead of the next country, UK).  In the most recent year for which we have 
data, 2009, they were the highest at 30% (five percentage points higher than France, the country 
with the next largest ETR).  In fact, in every year Japanese current ETRs are substantially higher 
than those in any country.
33  Ignoring Japan, the U.S., UK, France and Germany have had the 
highest current ETR in 19 of the 22 years, and none of those countries’ ETRs is ever more than 
nine percentage points below the penultimate ETR.   In 1989 (the first year for which we report 
their ETRs), the Tax Havens enjoyed the lowest multinational ETR at 22%, two percentage 
points below the next lowest ETR (Canada’s).  Since then, the Tax Havens, the Cayman Islands, 
Bermuda, and Taiwan have never had a year where their ETR was more than ten percentage 
points above the minimum ETR.   
Over the two decades, ETRs fell steadily.  For the nine countries with enough 
observations to report annual ETRs in both 2009 and 1989, all had lower ETRs in 2009 than in 
1989 with a mean and median decline of 12 percentage points.  The largest ETRs drops were 22 
percentage points for Japan and 15 percentage points for Switzerland and the UK.  The U.S. had 
a decline of 12 percentage points from 32% in 1989 to 20% in 2009.  Thirteen of the 17 countries 
with enough observations to compute annual ETRs in both 2009 and 1999 experienced a 
reduction in their ETR with a mean (median) decline of 3 (5) percentage points.  The largest 
                                                            
33 Though beyond the scope of this study, Japan’s remarkable ability to sustain substantially higher tax rates than its 
trading partners throughout two decades warrants further investigation.  Ishi (2001) and Griffith and Klemm (2004) 
(among others) document the gap, but we are aware of no study that attempts to ascertain the reasons why the gap 
has persisted for such a long period.  That said, Japan is currently debating a reduction in their corporate income tax 
rate from 40% to 35%, which would be effective April 1, 2011. 19 
 
declines in ETR were 12 percentage points (Japan and Germany).  The U.S. ETR fell percentage 
points from 25% in 1999 to 20% in 2009.
34   
Of course, the relatively low ETRs in 2009 may reflect the worldwide recession.  Indeed, 
six countries (Bermuda, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and Europe) never experienced 
lower ETRs than they did in 2009.  Furthermore, when we compare 2009 ETRs with those in 
2006, we find that the 2006 ETRs are 2 percentage points higher, on average.  Furthermore, 
when we compare 2006 ETRs with 1999 ETRs, we find no decline in ETRs, on average.  We 
infer from this analysis that ETRs did fall during the latest recession, whether this was caused by 
declining profitability (recall that we limit our sample to profitable companies) or a resumption 
of the long, slow slide in ETRs is indeterminable.  Furthermore, it is possible that ETRs in 2006 
were higher than would have been the case, had the economy not been so strong during the 
middle years of that decade.  Nevertheless, the particularly low ETRs in the latter years of the 
decade should be cautiously interpreted in light of the global economic downturn.  
To summarize, despite steady global declines in ETRs, the rank order of countries has 
remained remarkably constant over time.  Japan’s ETRs continued to far exceed those from any 
other country.  In fact, the smallest Japanese ETR over the two decades (30% in 2009) would 
have exceeded the ETR for any other country in any year since 2000.  Similarly, the tax havens 
have consistently enjoyed the lowest ETRs.  However, the spread between high-tax countries and 
tax havens has narrowed over the two decades because the tax havens began with low tax rates 
and maintained them, while all high-tax countries have reduced their ETRs.  The U.S. ETR has 
declined at the average rate, keeping it among the highest taxed countries and substantially 
trailing only those in Japan.       
                                                            
34 These findings are consistent with those of the 2008 study by the OECD discussed in Hodge (2008) which 
documented that 2008 was the seventeenth consecutive year in which the average statutory corporate tax rate in non-
U.S. OECD countries fell while the U.S. rate remained unchanged.   20 
 
 
4.5.  Do ETRs vary across industries? 
To assess whether ETRs vary across industries, we estimate a modified equation (1) 
using current ETRs and industry groupings based on two-digit NAICS codes.  We group two-
digit codes to ensure that each reported industry has at least 800 firm-years.  All observations are 
included in the regressions, but only cells with 20 or more observations are reported.
35  
Manufacturers comprise 41% of the firm-years. 
Table 4 shows considerable variation across industry ETRs.  Averaging across all 
countries, we find that the average current ETR ranges from Mining at 11% to Retail Trade at 
27%.  Retail Trade has the highest ETR in the U.S. and Japan.  When we limit the analysis to the 
13 countries/groups with ETRs for at least five industries, we find that the maximum rate appears 
in different industries for different countries.  Finance has the highest rate for three countries 
(France, India and Sweden).  Other is highest in Germany, Europe, and Latin America.  The only 
industries that are never the highest are Manufacturing, Mining, and Real Estate.   
Mining is clearly the least taxed industry.  Averaging across all countries, its 11% ETR is 
seven percentage points below Information.  Moreover, for the six countries reporting Mining 
ETRs (Australia, Canada, Japan, the UK, the U.S., and Europe), the Mining ETR is the lowest 
across all industries.  Among the seven other countries with at least five industries, thrice 
Information has the lowest ETR. 
Despite the variation across industry ETRs, those countries with high ETRs in general 
tend to have high ETRs across most industries and those countries with low ETRs in general tend 
                                                            
35 Requiring 20 observations ensures that the reported ETR is not driven by a few country-years.  However, readers 
should be cautious in interpreting these figures for countries with fewer observations because they may represent a 
handful of companies who appear in multiple years.  More reliance can be placed on their countries with larger 
samples.  Those include Canada, Japan, Taiwan, the UK, the U.S., Europe, and the Tax Havens, each of which totals 
more than 500 observations (see Table 1). 21 
 
to have low ETRs across most industries.  Japanese ETRs equal or exceed those from all other 
countries in every industry, except Mining.  Consistent with its being a tax haven, Bermuda has 
the lowest ETRs in four of the five industries in which it has enough observations to report an 
ETR.  The U.S. has the lowest Mining ETR at 6%.    
  Countries also differ substantially in the extent to which ETRs vary across their 
industries.  Using the coefficient of variation for each country’s industry ETRs as a standardized 
measure of the spread, among those countries with at least five ETRs, we find that Bermuda, at 
12%, has the least variation among industry ETRs.  India (34%), Australia (33%) and the U.S. 
(32%) have the most variation, suggesting that those countries have more industry-specific 
provisions than do other countries. 
   We infer from the results in Table 4 that ETRs vary widely across industries and industry 
ETRs vary widely within countries.  Nonetheless, the relative ETR across industries seems 
similar across all countries.  Furthermore, high-tax countries tend to tax all industries more than 
low-tax countries do.  Finally, scholars should note that failure to control for cross-industry 
variation in ETRs could lead to erroneous inferences about tax burdens across countries.  For 
example, although only 3% of our sample companies are in Mining, 24% of Canadian companies 
are in that industry.  Since Mining is a lightly taxed industry, Canada might appear to be a lower-
taxed country than would be the case if its industry mix was more representative of the global 
mix.  This difference in industry mix should not affect our earlier estimates, however, because 
we control for industry in equation (1).    
 
4.6. Additional Tests 22 
 
The data enable us to conduct a battery of additional tests and robustness checks, which 
we discuss briefly in this section. In every case, the inferences drawn above hold.   
One, it is difficult to determine where the profits generated from intangible assets are 
earned.  As a result, firms with large amounts of intangible assets may be better able to avoid 
taxes (see discussions in Huizinga et al., 2008, Mutti and Grubert, 2007, and Desai et al., 2006, 
among many others).  To assess whether firms with greater amounts of intangibles have lower 
ETRs, we would ideally sort firms based on their levels of intangible assets.  Unfortunately, 
information about the amount of intangible assets is not publicly available.  Thus, we turn to an 
observable figure, total research and development expenses, which, we assume, is positively 
correlated with the firm’s level of intangibles.  We estimate equation (1) for those firm-years 
with positive values for research and development expenses, modifying the equation to include a 
categorical variable for those firm-years where research and development expense as a 
percentage of total assets is above the median.  Consistent with high intangible firms having 
lower ETRs, we find that the coefficient on the categorical variable is -2.0% and highly 
significant.  
Two, some have conjectured that a territorial system collects less revenue than a 
worldwide system.  Concerns about the revenue implications of excluding dividend taxation 
under a territorial system has become of central importance since the UK and Japan in 
December, 2008, decided to revamp their international tax laws by shifting from a worldwide tax 
system to a territorial tax system.  Meanwhile, President Obama has proposed to strengthen the 
U.S.’s worldwide tax system by restricting deferral of U.S. taxation on foreign profits, while 
U.S. multinationals are coalescing around a territorial system with generous deductions of 23 
 
worldwide expenses.
36  To test the impact of a worldwide system on ETRs, we estimate equation 
(1), after adding a categorical variable equal to one if the parent country has a worldwide tax 
system, and zero otherwise.   Contrary to expectations, the estimate of the coefficient on the 
worldwide indicator is -1.4% and significant, indicating that, on average, firms domiciled in 
worldwide countries face lower ETRs.     
Three, in countries with imputation, the corporate income tax serves as a form of 
withholding tax because the corporate tax (or some part of it) can be used to offset shareholders’ 
dividend taxes.  Thus, it is possible that corporate tax planning is less important in imputation 
countries because firms in those countries have less incentive to lower their ETRs than do those 
in classical systems, such as the U.S., where corporate taxes do not offset shareholder taxes.  We 
test this possibility by modifying equation (1) to include a categorical variable that indicates 
whether the firm is domiciled in a country with any form of imputation.  We find that the 
estimated coefficient on the imputation variable is insignificant.  
Four, another cross-country difference is whether tax losses can be carried back to offset 
the prior year’s taxable income.
37  When we add a categorical variable indicating whether a 




36 See Weiner (2009), United States House of Representatives (2007), Clausing and Avi-Yonah (2007), and The 
President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005), among many others, for proposals about U.S. 
international tax law reform.  Interestingly, a principal cost of repealing deferral for some companies would be the 
deleterious impact on book income.  Under current tax law, APB 23 permits firms to classify foreign profits as 
permanently reinvested, which enables them to report no deferred income taxes for any possible U.S. taxes to be 
paid at repatriation (see Graham et al., 2010, Graham et al., 2011 and Shackelford et al., 2011, among others).  
Repealing deferral would render this discretion under APB 23 irrelevant.  This possibility led Ralph Hellmann, lead 
lobbyist for the Information Technology Industry Council, to state that the benefit of APB 23 deferral “…hits the 
bottom line of companies more than any other issue right now.  We have to defeat it [repeal of deferral].” (Drucker, 
2009).   
37 This information is obtained from International Tax Summaries prepared by Deloitte and available through its 
website. 
38 We conduct no tests concerning the carryforward of losses because Estonia is the only country that does not 
permit it. 24 
 
Five, the corporate income tax is only one of many taxes, and in many countries, it is a 
relatively minor source of government revenue.  To the extent countries rely on alternative taxes, 
they may need less revenue from corporate income taxes, which are the sole tax used to compute 
ETRs.  Alternatively, high income tax countries may levy high taxes across the board.  
Consistent with a trade-off among revenue sources, we find that the value-added tax rate is 
negatively correlated with ETRs.
39  When we exclude companies domiciled in the U.S. (the only 
major country without a value-added tax), the correlation is even more negative.  To determine 
whether the value-added tax affects the inferences drawn above, we include the value-added tax 
rate in equation (1) and find a positive and significant coefficient estimate.  However, inferences 
about the relative ETRs across countries are unaltered.   
Six, we include the maximum statutory corporate income tax rate in equation (1).  As 
expected, we find a positive coefficient on the statutory rate, and the relative ranks of the 
countries/groups somewhat altered.  This implies that the ETRs are driven by differences in both 
tax rates and tax bases.   
Seven, the sample excludes all firm-years with losses (i.e., negative NIBT).  In this 
sensitivity test, we add back the 11,416 firm-years with losses and actual ETRs (from the 
financial statements) that equal zero and estimate equation (1).
40  By definition, adding these loss 
firm-years lowers the estimated ETRs.  We find that the inclusion of loss firm-years has 
inconsequential impact on the relative high-tax to low-tax rank across the countries: the Japanese 
ETR remain the highest at 21%, three percentage points above the African ETR.  The Bermudan 
ETR is the lowest at 2%, two percentage points below the Cayman Islands’ ETR.     
                                                            
39 We thank Kevin Hassett for providing us with the valued-add tax data. 
40 Consistent with the main tests, we exclude observations for which the absolute value of ETR is greater than 70%. 25 
 
Eight, the sample includes firm-years with zero ETRs as long as their NIBT was positive.  
In this robustness check, we drop those 1,372 firm-years with non-positive ETRs as reported in 
the financial statements.  By definition, eliminating these zero ETR firms increases the estimated 
ETRs.  We find that the deletion of non-positive ETRs has inconsequential impact on the relative 
high-tax to low-tax rank across the countries: Japanese ETR is 36%, ten percentage points above 
that for the U.S., the country with the next highest ETR.  Bermudan and Cayman Islands' ETRs 
are the lowest at 13%.       
 
5.  Results from Comparing Foreign Subsidiaries 
5.1. How much does the location of its foreign subsidiaries affect a multinational’s ETR? 
In this section, we expand the domestic-multinational dichotomy to consider whether the 
domiciles of foreign subsidiaries affect ETRs.  We begin by turning our attention to tax havens, 
the most extreme example of a low-tax country.  If companies domiciled in tax havens enjoy 
lower ETRs than companies domiciled in other countries (as the evidence above suggests), then 
it follows that multinationals with tax havens should have substantially lower ETRs than 
multinationals without tax havens.   
To test this proposition, we modify equation (1) by adding a categorical variable 
indicating whether a multinational had a tax haven, interacting it with the COUNTRY*MN 
variable in equation (1), and estimating the equation.  Surprisingly, we find that multinationals 
with tax havens do not have lower ETRs than multinationals without havens (results are 
untabulated).  In fact, the current ETR, averaged across all countries is 17% for multinationals 
without havens and 19% for multinationals with havens.  Both figures are 23% for American 
multinationals, and for almost half of the countries/groups (including France, India, Japan, the 26 
 
UK, and all three listings of tax havens) the spread is within percentage point.  One reason that 
having a haven may not result in a lower ETR is that the countries that establish tax havens are 
countries that would have substantially higher ETRs, if they had no haven.  Therefore, havens 
may lower ETRs, but not enough to overcome the boost to ETRs arising from higher 
profitability.  Unfortunately, we cannot observe the counter-factual, i.e., comparing 
multinationals with havens to those same companies if they had no havens.  Nonetheless, this 
initial test provides no evidence that the location of the subsidiary affects the worldwide ETR.       
Next, we move beyond a tax haven dichotomy to consider all countries where foreign 
subsidiaries exist.  In Equation (1), we use the presence of a foreign subsidiary to distinguish 
multinationals from domestic-only firms.  Here, we replace that single categorical variable with 
categorical variables for all locations of foreign subsidiaries.  The coefficients on the foreign 
subsidiary variables enable us to assess the extent to which the location of a foreign subsidiary 
affects the ETRs of the worldwide enterprise.  The regression equation is:   
                       
              
  
															                 
               
              
       												 2  
where:       
    an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i reports a subsidiary in country 
k, equal to 0 otherwise. 
All other variables are defined the same as in equation (1).  The estimated regression coefficients 
on SUB are the estimated impact on ETRs arising from having a subsidiary in a particular foreign 
country.   
We continue to use the same 21 groups as in the previous section for the parents but 
allow countries to have their own SUB indicator if they host subsidiaries of 500 or more parents.  
Each firm-year has one country in which its COUNTRY variable is coded one.  However, it has n 27 
 
SUBs coded one, where n is the number of different countries in which the parent has at least one 
subsidiary.
41 
We use the same sample of 28,343 firm-years (from 2005-2009) with current income tax 
expense as the numerator for the ETR that was used in Table 2.  For these firm-years, there are 
80,723 SUB variables with a value of one.  All 56subsidiary locations have at least 200 firm-
years.  The UK is the most popular location for foreign subsidiaries with 7,608 firm-years.    
Table 5 shows the regression coefficient estimates for COUNTRY and SUB.  The 
COUNTRY coefficients from equation (2) should be the same as the COUNTRY coefficients 
from equation (1), except to the extent that identifying the location of a firm’s foreign 
subsidiaries, as opposed to just identifying the existence of a foreign subsidiary provides 
information.  It seems plausible that knowing the subsidiary’s domicile would substantially 
affect inferences because foreign subsidiaries are not randomly distributed across parents.  
Multinationals from some countries might be more likely to operate in high-tax countries (e.g., 
French companies may be more likely to have a subsidiary in high-tax Germany than would be 
Taiwanese companies, which might partially account for the higher ETRs in France.).  That said, 
we find that specifying the location of the foreign subsidiary in the regression only results in only 
one COUNTRY coefficients changing more than three percentage points from the corresponding 
COUNTRY coefficients in Table 2.  The domestic Indian ETR rises from 15% to 19%. 
We now turn our attention to the SUB coefficients.  We expect cross-country variation in 
the SUB coefficients to the extent that locating a foreign subsidiary in a country affects the 
multinational’s ETR.  For example, if a firm can shift profits from a high-tax country to a tax 
haven, then its ETR should be lower and the SUB coefficient for the haven should reflect those 
                                                            
41 For example, if a U.S. parent has subsidiaries in Canada, Germany, and Bermuda,          ,          , 
          , and            would be coded one, while all other         and     variables would be coded 
zero. 28 
 
tax savings.  These SUB coefficients are conditional on the location of all other foreign 
subsidiaries.  Thus, they can be interpreted as the incremental impact on ETRs of having a 
subsidiary in a particular foreign country.   
The SUB coefficients range from a 1.6 percentage points decrease in ETRs for 
multinationals with a subsidiary in the Tax Havens to a 2.6 percentage points increase in ETRs 
for multinationals with a subsidiary in Croatia.  Besides the Tax Havens, the dozen most 
negative SUB coefficients include tax havens, such as the Singapore (-1.2 percentage points) and 
Bermuda (-0.7 percentage points) plus a country widely associated with global tax mitigation, 
Hong Kong, at -0.8 percentage points.  These findings are consistent with a foreign subsidiary in 
at least some tax havens lowering the parent’s ETR.  However, interestingly, two other countries 
associated with tax avoidance, the Netherlands and Ireland, have positive coefficients.   
Not surprisingly, some of the more positive SUB coefficients include countries with 
relatively high taxes, e.g., France (1.3 percentage points), the UK (1.2), Italy (0.9) and Japan 
(0.7).  However, once again the results are a bit mixed.  When we segregate the sample based on 
OECD membership, we find no evidence that subsidiaries located in (usually high-tax) OECD 
countries boost the ETRs of their multinational enterprise more than subsidiaries located in other 
(often lower taxed) countries. 
Contrary to high-tax countries resulting in highly tax subsidiaries, we find that having a 
U.S. subsidiary lowers a multinational’s ETR by 0.5 percentage points.  This finding is 
consistent with the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s (2008) report that U.S.-controlled 
U.S. companies pay more taxes than foreign-controlled U.S. companies.  It provides support for 
arguments by U.S. companies that they face a competitive disadvantage in the U.S. marketplace, 
since most non-U.S. multinationals (Japanese multinationals being the notable exception) already 29 
 
lower ETRs before the added bonus of an ETR reduction when they establish an American 
subsidiary.   
Finally, we measure the correlation between the COUNTRY coefficients and the SUB 
coefficients in Table 5 for the 20 countries/groups with both COUNTRY and SUB coefficients.  If 
countries tax their domestic-only firms similarly to the foreign-controlled subsidiaries domiciled 
in their country, then the COUNTRY coefficients (indicating ETRs for domestic-only firms) 
should be positively correlated with the SUB coefficients (indicating the incremental ETR for 
multinationals with subsidiaries in that country).  Consistent with this expectation, we find a 
positive correlation between the COUNTRY and SUB coefficients of 37%, which is significant at 
the 0.05 level using a one-tailed test.  We interpret these findings as evidence that countries that 
tax their domestic-only firms heavily also tax their foreign subsidiaries heavily and vice versa.  
Though not surprising, to our knowledge, this is the first documentation that domestic-only firms 
and foreign subsidiaries in the same country face relatively similar levels of taxation.   
We infer from this array of tests that some evidence exists that the domicile of the 
subsidiary affects the overall firm ETR; however, the evidence is far from overwhelming.  
Although we find no ETR difference between multinationals with tax havens and those without, 
some SUB coefficients are consistent with low-tax countries lowering overall ETRs and high-tax 
countries increasing them.  Yet, there are notable exceptions to this pattern, e.g., Ireland, the 
Netherlands and the U.S.  Nevertheless, we do find that countries that tax parents heavily tend to 
tax foreign subsidiaries heavily and vice versa.  All in all, the evidence is mixed about whether 
the domicile of the foreign subsidiary affects the multinational’s overall effective tax rate.   
 
5.2. Parent-subsidiary interactions 30 
 
One possible reason for the mixed findings in the prior section is that we restrict the SUB 
coefficient to be the same, regardless of the domicile of the parent.  For example, establishing a 
subsidiary in Ireland may substantially lower an American firm’s ETR while having little effect 
on the ETR of a multinational domiciled in the UK.  If so, by forcing the same SUB coefficient 
on Ireland for all countries, we may be masking its differential impact across countries.  Thus, in 
this section, we alter the research design to allow for the possibility that foreign subsidiaries 
affect the ETRs of their parents differently depending on the domicile of the parent.   
To conduct this extension, we modify equation (2) by replacing the SUB variables with 
interactions between the COUNTRY and SUB variables.  We then compare the coefficients on 
the interactions to assess the extent to which subsidiaries affect parents differently, depending on 
whether the parent is in a high-tax or low-tax country.     
                       
                   
  ∗        
  
																                 
               
              
       																			 3 				 
Table 6 presents the estimated interaction coefficients (no coefficients are shown unless 
there are at least 50 observations in a cell) for major parent locations and select subsidiary 
countries.  The dependent variable is always current ETR, except for the last column, which 
reports results for the U.S. only, using the cash ETR as the dependent variable (no other country 
has enough cash ETR observations to warrant tabulation).
42    
There are far too many COUNTRY*SUM coefficients in Table 6 to cover them in any 
detail here.  Thus, for brevity, we comment only on U.S. inbound and outbound activities and 
leave the many other statistics in this table for the reader to peruse.  Beginning with inbound 
                                                            
42 Each number in Table 6 represents the marginal ETR impact from a particular parent-subsidiary country mix.  For 
example, on the first line the -8.9 means that a French parent has a 8.9 percentage points lower current ETR, on 
average, if it has a subsidiary in Argentina. 31 
 
investment, Table 5 shows that a subsidiary in the U.S. lowers a multinational’s current ETR by 
0.5 percentage points, on average.  Table 6 expands the analysis to show that having a subsidiary 
in the U.S. affects a multinational differently, depending on its domicile, suggesting that the SUB 
coefficient constraint in equation (2) materially affects inferences.  We find that the marginal 
effect of an American subsidiary on current ETRs ranges from a decrease of 1.9 percentage 
points for a European parent to an increase of 3.8 percentage points for a German parent.   
For outbound investment from the U.S., we turn to the last column in the table, which 
shows the marginal effect on cash taxes paid for an American multinational having operations in 
various countries.  We find weak evidence that investments in developed, (generally) high-tax 
countries increase U.S. companies’ cash ETRs.  Locating a subsidiary in an OECD country listed 
increases the American multinational’s cash ETR by 0.2 percentage point, while a subsidiary in a 
non-OECD country drives down the U.S. multinational’s ETR by 0.5 percentage point.  The 
difference is significant at the 10% level.   
However, locating a subsidiary in a tax haven (Ireland, Luxembourg, Singapore or the 
Tax Havens) lowers U.S. multinationals’ cash ETRs by -1.2 percentage points, on average.
43  
This is significantly less than the 0.05 percentage point increase for the non-haven countries (at 
the 0.05 level).  Moreover, if tax havens are typically paired with subsidiaries in high-tax 
locations (e.g., if Bermudan subsidiaries always co-exist with higher taxed British subsidiaries), 
then clustering effects among subsidiaries may understate the importance of tax havens because 
the tax haven coefficients may be capturing some of their companion high-tax countries’ impact 
on ETRs (Dyreng et al, 2011).   
 
                                                            
43Even though they are computed with different data and methodology, this study’s 1.2 percentage point cash ETR 
reduction for these four tax havens is similar to Dyreng and Lindsey’s (2009) 1.5 percentage point estimate for tax 
haven activity by U.S. multinationals.    32 
 
6.  Closing Remarks 
To our knowledge, this paper provides the most comprehensive analysis of international 
corporate income tax expense to date.  It is the first study to compute effective taxes using cash 
taxes paid and current and total income tax expense data for thousands of companies around the 
world.  Our principal findings include: The domiciliary location of a multinational company 
substantially affects its worldwide tax liability.  Japanese multinationals consistently face the 
highest ETRs.  American multinationals face among the next highest ETRs.  Tax haven 
multinationals enjoy the lowest ETRs.  Multinationals and domestic-only firms face similar 
ETRs.  ETRs declined worldwide over the last two decades; however, the ordinal rank from 
high-tax countries to low-tax countries remained remarkably constant.  ETRs vary considerably 
across industries.  The evidence mostly shows that the location of its foreign subsidiaries affects 
a multinational’s worldwide ETR. 
Understanding the role that domicile plays in multinational decisions is central to both 
scholarly and policy discussions about international taxes.  Two decades ago, the taxation of 
multinationals was an obscure area of the law, understood by few practitioners, rarely mentioned 
in policy circles, and largely ignored by academe.  Today, globalization has made the taxation of 
international commerce relevant to most businesses, central to policy discussions about jobs, 
trade, and competitiveness, and an area of principal interest to scholars in economics, 
accounting, law, finance, and related fields.  The ETR estimates in this study should provide 
useful and needed quantitative information as policymakers, business, and scholars around the 
globe grapple with the complexities surrounding the taxation of multinational activities. 
By shedding light on the importance of domicile for multinationals, the paper is 
particularly timely for American policymakers as the U.S. struggles to respond to Japan and the 33 
 
UK’s recent decisions to adopt territorial taxation, which have left the U.S. as the sole major 
power still employing a system of worldwide taxation.  To the ire of many U.S.-domiciled 
multinationals, President Obama has proposed strengthening the worldwide system through 
further restrictions on the deferral of U.S. tax on foreign profits.  U.S. multinationals appear to be 
coalescing around territorial taxation as long as expenses related to foreign-source income can 
still be deducted against U.S. income.  The findings in this study may hasten the development of 
U.S. tax reform by showing that U.S. multinational ETRs are among the highest in the world.  
Moreover, if territorial taxation further lowers the taxes on Japanese and British multinationals, 
then the U.S. may be forced to provide some tax relief for its multinationals to maintain some 
level of international tax competitiveness. 
Further work is warranted to understand how the tax order of countries has remained so 
steady over two decades of radical worldwide changes in tax policy, financial reporting, 
economic development, law, politics, technology, and many other areas.  Although tax rates have 
fallen dramatically over the last 20 years, high-tax countries remain high-tax, and low-tax 
countries remain low-tax.  Perhaps globalization permits countries to change their tax systems 
but forces a herding effect because tax changes in one country reverberate around the globe (see 
Griffith and Klemm, 2005, for a discussion of tax competition among OECD countries).  If so, 
countries, including the U.S., may find it difficult to sustain policies that do not conform to 
international norms. 
As with any empirical study, simplifying assumptions are necessary.  We close by 
repeating a few of the key caveats in this paper.  First, although the data are superior to any in the 
past, they are incomplete.  We have accounting information, not actual tax returns.  We only 
know the location of foreign subsidiaries in the most recent year of the data.  The data may not 34 
 
capture all foreign subsidiaries.  Furthermore, our analysis assumes that the decision to locate a 
subsidiary in a foreign country is made without consideration of the portfolio of current 
subsidiary locations or possible ones in the future.  Finally, although we have the most extensive 
database to date, some countries have a limited number of domiciled companies.  Therefore, 
readers should interpret data for small countries with some caution.  That said, the study is the 
best attempt to date to compare the effective tax rates of all publicly-traded companies around 
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Table 1 – Summary statistics by country/group.  2005-2009. 
 
This table presents the means of the variables by country/group and firm type (DOM = domestic, MNAT = multinational).  All figures are in 
millions of U.S. dollars.  ETR = current tax expense/pretax income.  Statutory rate is the weighted average maximum corporate rate for the group, 



































































































DOM 13,917       993            2,266         543          93            28        30        39       
MNAT 14,426       5,309         14,386       2,553       587          27        28        39       
DOM 104          1,416       2,404       563        125         22        25       30     
MNAT 342          2,311       12,549     1,775     505         22        26       30     
DOM 29            1,004       2,546       1,566     276         5          2         0
MNAT 289          840          1,307       474        110         12        9         0
DOM 568          997          1,809       641        118         14        7         36     
MNAT 603          2,359       7,062       1,936     417         21        21       36     
DOM 9              201          308          215        42           10        8         0
MNAT 198          312          454          259        52           13        11       0
DOM 150          389          4,109       594        69           25        28       35     
MNAT 212          17,583     67,342     8,325     1,828     23        25       35     
DOM 116          3,837       2,347       506        100         16        13       37     
MNAT 324          13,431     51,792     5,902     1,060     24        25       37     
DOM 113          597          1,657       363        109         22        23       34     
MNAT 269          774          1,350       491        135         17        14       34     
DOM 6,194       703          2,574       377        45           37        41       40     
MNAT 3,258       5,563       11,256     2,308     341         36        37       40     
DOM 174          465          1,503       374        61           19        19       27     
MNAT 107          615          6,346       650        144         17        18       27     
DOM 71            575          1,203       729        165         18        19       29     
MNAT 150          2,466       9,150       1,342     422         25        26       29     
DOM 94            243          682          284        61           10        2         28     
MNAT 196          2,268       9,033       1,545     386         18        20       28     
DOM 50            1,461       3,127       1,591     394         17        15       21     
MNAT 164          8,574       62,774     4,848     1,093     19        18       21     
DOM 207          1,139       1,887       718        111         20        20       25     
MNAT 689          1,993       1,984       795        147         18        17       25     
DOM 1,047       344          683          306        60           20        22       30     
MNAT 892          5,452       34,334     3,211     788         24        26       30     
DOM 3,830       1,655       2,366       771        152         23        25       39     
MNAT 5,244       6,358       11,496     2,964     804         28        30       39     
DOM 13            269          1,026       189        51           21        23       26     
MNAT 25            471          3,042       532        128         21        21       30     
DOM 210          826          1,662       444        110         21        20       32     
MNAT 67            1,981       5,736       1,130     240         18        19       31     
DOM 556          642          1,327       440        97           21        21       23     
MNAT 842          5,325       22,379     2,458     616         21        22       29     
DOM 166          1,366       1,976       815        159         21        21       30     
MNAT 111          4,179       8,632       2,070     849         24        22       28     
DOM 47            480          1,771       325        104         11        10       15     
MNAT 110          965          5,473       898        192         17        11       31     
DOM 169          1,297       5,393       2,509     367         10        8         18     
























Table 2 – Main results.  Pooled sample 2005-2009. 
 
This table presents the results of estimating         ∑              
    ∑               
  ∗       	           on three separate samples, each with     calculated as the tax measure in the 
column heading scaled by pretax income.  The subcolumns titled Actual report the mean     as reported on the financial statements.  The subcolumns titled Estimate report the estimates of the 
coefficients. The Domestic Estimate is the estimate of    for each country/group.  The Multinational Estimate is the estimate of (  +	    for each country/group.  All available observations were 
included in the estimation, but estimates are only reported for countries/groups having 50 or more observations. * indicates that	   is statistically significant at the 5% level, i.e., that the number in the 
Domestic Estimate column is statistically different from the number in the corresponding Multinational Estimate column.  For example, the estimate of cashETR for Canadian domestic firms (14%) is 
statistically different from the estimate for Canadian multinational firms (19%).   
AdjR2 0.71        0.80        0.87       
N 12,509    28,343    41,642   
Actual Estimate Actual Estimate Actual Estimate Actual Estimate Actual Estimate Actual Estimate
AUSTRALIA 26          23           24           22  22          20           22           19  26          27           26           26 
BERMUDA 14           14  12           9  16           17 
CANADA 15          14           20           19* 14          13           21           18* 23          23           26           26*
CAYMAN ISLANDS 13           10  15           16 
FRANCE 27           22  25          23           23           19* 27          28           29           28 
GERMANY 25           22  16          15           24           19* 27          29           29           29 
INDIA 18           17  22          19           17           13* 26          26           21           22*
JAPAN 37          33           36           31* 42          41           39           39*
MALAYSIA 19          19           19          16           17           15  23          24           19           20*
SOUTH AFRICA 18          16           25           20* 25          26           29           28*
SWEDEN 10          10           18           14* 19          21           25           25*
SWITZERLAND 19           15  17          18           19           14* 19          22           21           21 
TAIWAN 20          17           18           14* 20          21           18           19*
UNITED KINGDOM 22          20           24           22  20          17           24           20* 23          24           27           26*
UNITED STATES 22          20           25           21* 23          19           28           23* 29          30           30           30 
AFRICA 26           28 
ASIA 26          24           21          20           18           16  23          23           21           21*
EUROPE 26          24           23           21* 21          20           21           18  25          26           25           26 
LATIN AMERICA 19          19           19           16  21          18           24           19  24          25           23           23*
MIDDLE EAST 11           11  17           14  13          15           18           19*
TAX HAVENS 18           16  10          10           15           13* 16          18           17           18 
cash ETR current ETR total ETR
Domestic Multinational Domestic Multinational Domestic Multinational43 
 
Table 3 – Results by year, 1988-2009.  Current tax expense.  Multinationals and Domestics pooled. 
 
 
This table presents the results of estimating        ∑             
 	          on separate samples for each year.              	   	              	       ⁄ .  Each cell reports the estimate 
of    for each country/group.  Estimates are reported for country-years with 20 or more observations. 
  
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AdjR2 0.92      0.92      0.90      0.91      0.90      0.89      0.88      0.87      0.87      0.87      0.86      0.84      0.84      0.82      0.79      0.77      0.78      0.79      0.80      0.82      0.81      0.79     
N 2,295     2,460     2,501     2,510     2,543     2,744     3,253     3,736     4,307     4,545     4,364     4,773     4,834     4,365     4,890     5,780     6,415     6,298     7,532     5,848     4,318     4,347    
AUSTRALIA 29       22       22       20       22       22       19       20       22       16       18       16       19       21       23       21       18       17      
BERMUDA 10       12       9         9         10       7         11       11       8         9         10       11       12       12       7        
CANADA 14       24       15       19       21       19       22       21       22       20       19       21       21       20       19       15       18       19       18       18       16       15      
CAYMAN ISLANDS 8         8         8         12       11       9         13       13      
FRANCE 29       21       26       24       23       25       27       29       29       29       28       27       26       25       25       24       25       21       22       18       25      
GERMANY 29       33       32       31       31       27       26       28       21       18       21       19       20       19      
INDIA 22       12       8         13       12       17       12       6         9         8         12       15       12       13       17       17       18       19      
JAPAN 44       52       41       48       46       43       45       44       44       43       43       42       41       38       36       32       33       34       34       34       36       30      
MALAYSIA 32       25       25       28       25       27       22       21       5         21       23       22       18       20       20       17       16       17       15      
SOUTH AFRICA 16       14       13       18       18       16       20       21       20       21       20      
SWEDEN 20       15       18       19       18       19       20       22       18       15       16       15       15       13       15       11      
SWITZERLAND 26       19       27       20       12       22       20       22       19       20       19       21       21       19       19       20       20       17       11      
TAIWAN 12       8         12       8         8         8         12       11       12       15       15       15       18       16      
UNITED KINGDOM 24       33       25       31       27       24       28       26       28       25       24       24       23       22       22       20       20       19       20       20       22       18      
UNITED STATES 22       32       23       30       26       23       27       26       27       25       24       25       25       23       21       18       20       24       23       24       23       20      
ASIA 12       18       20       22       21       18       18       23       20       16       14       22       21       22       18       20       16      
EUROPE 27       20       24       20       17       21       21       23       22       22       25       25       24       25       23       22       22       20       20       20       17      
LATIN AMERICA 8         15       12       10       13       19       15       21       14       16       22       19       20       22       18      
MIDDLE EAST 13       13       15       18       16       15       14       17       18      
TAX HAVENS 22       15       18       16       12       17       16       18       16       13       16       16       14       14       14       16       15       14       11       13       11       
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Table 4 – Results by industry. 2005-2009. Current tax expense.  Multinationals and Domestics pooled. 
 
This table reports the results of estimating         ∑              
             for each industry (two-digit NAICS numbers included in 
each group are included in parentheses. Each cell reports the estimate of   for the given country in the given industry.  All firm-years in 2005-
2009 in the industry were included in the regressions. Estimates are reported for country-industries with 20 or more observations.       





























































































































































AdjR2 0.80      0.74      0.78      0.84         0.63      0.84      0.83      0.79      0.89      0.83     
N 1,071     2,897     1,815     11,002      812        4,229     1,522     952        1,534     919       
AUSTRALIA 24       26       23         8         24       24      
BERMUDA 11       10         12       12       14      
CANADA 19       18       14       19         9         20       26       23       15      
CAYMAN ISLANDS 12         14      
FRANCE 27       29       15       27         24       23       15      
GERMANY 18       18       24         24       19       19      
INDIA 23       27       13       19         12      
JAPAN 33       30       36       34         14       39       39       38       41       39      
MALAYSIA 24       21       14         21      
SOUTH AFRICA 18       22         20      
SWEDEN 19       11       19         17       13       12      
SWITZERLAND 18       18         17      
TAIWAN 16         24       15      
UNITED KINGDOM 26       19       17       22         15       22       25       19       24       19      
UNITED STATES 30       20       19       26         6         27       27       19       31       19      
AFRICA 23      
ASIA 20       22       16         24      
EUROPE 22       23       19       22         13       24       18       14       22       13      
LATIN AMERICA 19       23       17       20         24       24      
MIDDLE EAST 20       14         16      
TAX HAVENS 11       14       14       15         16       17       17       16       
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Table 5 – 2005-2009. Current tax expense.  Subsidiary specification. 
 
 
This table presents the results of estimating         ∑              
    ∑         
  	         .  The Parents column reports the estimate 
of    for each country/group.  The Subsidiaries column reports the estimate of 	   for each country/group. 
             	   	              	       ⁄ .  
AdjR2 0.80         
N 28,343     
Parents Estimate Subsidiaries Estimate Subsidiaries Estimate
AUSTRALIA 19             ARGENTINA 0.6           LUXEMBOURG (0.5)         
BERMUDA 10             AUSTRALIA 0.1           MALAYSIA (0.9)         
CANADA 16             AUSTRIA (0.7)          MEXICO 0.7          
CAYMAN ISLANDS 11             BELGIUM 0.3           NETHERLANDS 0.3          
FRANCE 21             BERMUDA (0.7)          NORWAY 0.9          
GERMANY 18             BRAZIL (0.5)          PERU 0.5          
INDIA 15             BULGARIA (1.3)          POLAND 0.2          
JAPAN 33             CANADA 0.6           PORTUGAL 0.4          
MALAYSIA 16             CAYMAN ISLANDS (0.1)          ROMANIA 0.0          
SOUTH AFRICA 19             CHILE 1.1           RUSSIA (0.6)         
SWEDEN 12             CHINA (0.3)          RUSSIAN FEDERATION (0.3)         
SWITZERLAND 15             COLOMBIA 1.4           SINGAPORE (1.2)         
TAIWAN 15             CROATIA 2.6           SLOVAKIA (1.6)         
UNITED KINGDOM 18             CZECH REPUBLIC (0.4)          SOUTH AFRICA 2.5          
UNITED STATES 21             DENMARK (0.1)          SOUTH KOREA (1.6)         
AFRICA 22             ESTONIA (0.4)          SPAIN (1.2)         
ASIA 19             FINLAND (0.2)          SWEDEN (0.2)         
EUROPE 19             FRANCE 1.3           SWITZERLAND 0.8          
LATIN AMERICA 19             GERMANY (0.5)          THAILAND (0.7)         
MIDDLE EAST 13             GREECE (0.5)          UNITED KINGDOM 1.2          
TAX HAVENS 12             HONG KONG (0.8)          UNITED STATES (0.5)         
HUNGARY 0.1           VENEZUELA (0.8)         
INDIA (0.4)          AFRICA 2.1          
IRELAND 0.4           ASIA 0.3          
ITALY 0.9           EUROPE (1.4)         
JAPAN 0.7           LATIN AMERICA 1.3          
LATVIA 0.3           MIDDLE EAST 0.7          
LITHUANIA 0.4           TAX HAVENS (1.6)          
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Table 6 – 2005-2009. Current tax expense.  Subsidiary specification. 
 
This table presents the results of estimating         ∑              
    ∑              
  ∗        
             on a subsample of the sample described in Table 
1 for which we have necessary subsidiary information.  Each cell reports the estimate of 	   for the interaction of the given parent and subsidiary variables.  For 
example, the estimate of 	  for the interaction term           
    ∗        
          is -0.3.  All interaction terms were included in the estimation, but estimates are 
only reported for cells with 50 or more observations.              	   	              	       ⁄  for all columns except the last.  The last column reports the 





































































ARGENTINA (8.9)        (1.1)        2.8         6.0         (0.3)        (0.0)       
AUSTRALIA (1.1)        (0.8)        0.5         0.9         1.1        
AUSTRIA (0.6)        (2.5)        0.6         4.3         (0.3)        (0.8)        1.7         (0.7)        0.7        
BELGIUM (4.8)        (5.3)        0.4         (3.8)        1.3         2.0         1.0         0.8         1.4        
BERMUDA (1.8)       
BRAZIL 1.7         1.4         (2.0)        (2.0)        1.7         3.8         (0.5)        (0.5)       
BULGARIA 2.5         (9.3)       
CANADA 0.8         (3.5)        (2.6)        (0.9)        (0.2)        (0.5)        1.8         1.4        
CAYMAN ISLANDS 1.3        
CHILE 11.7       (0.3)        7.3         (1.5)        0.3         2.3        
CHINA 1.3         (0.4)        (1.8)        (1.6)       
COLOMBIA 2.6        
CROATIA 0.2         4.3        
CZECH REPUBLIC (1.9)        5.2         0.8         (6.5)        (3.5)        (0.6)        (0.1)        0.4        
DENMARK 3.6         (1.1)        3.5         1.5         (2.2)        (1.0)        (0.7)        (1.4)       
ESTONIA 5.1         (0.1)        0.3        
FINLAND (7.6)        1.5         0.1         5.2         0.7         0.4         (0.3)        0.5        
FRANCE (1.9)        1.8         4.0         4.8         1.0         (0.2)        1.0         1.1        
GERMANY (6.7)        (0.0)        1.0         (4.3)        2.2         2.7         (1.1)        (0.7)        (2.0)       
GREECE (8.8)        3.5         (10.3)      (2.6)        (0.4)       
HONG KONG (0.9)        (0.8)       
HUNGARY (2.7)        (4.0)        4.4         1.9         (2.4)        0.8        
INDIA 0.8         (1.5)        (2.7)       
IRELAND 6.1         0.5         (1.0)        0.8         (1.5)        (0.5)        (1.6)       
ITALY 5.8         2.0         0.6         1.2         1.2         2.8         (0.7)        1.5         1.7        
JAPAN 6.8         (1.2)        (0.8)        (2.6)        2.4         (5.9)        0.4         0.2        
LATVIA (2.7)       
LUXEMBOURG (3.1)        2.5         (2.3)        (3.4)        0.5         (0.8)        (1.1)       
MALAYSIA (1.2)        0.1         1.0        
MEXICO (2.2)        1.3         (0.5)        0.0         (0.4)        2.8         0.9         1.4        
NETHERLANDS (0.3)        3.9         (1.1)        (7.3)        (1.7)        0.3         3.8         (1.2)        (0.1)        (0.5)       
NORWAY 2.7         (6.8)        (1.4)        1.0         6.0         (0.4)        0.5         0.3        
PERU (1.3)       
POLAND 10.7       1.5         (0.6)        (1.5)        8.2         (3.6)        (0.7)        2.1         2.7        
PORTUGAL (2.3)        3.8         0.2         (3.1)        (0.4)        1.1         (0.9)       
ROMANIA (2.9)        3.9         2.1         (0.8)        1.9         (0.3)       
RUSSIA (4.0)        1.1        
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 3.6         (5.3)        (0.5)        (0.1)        1.2         (1.6)        (1.6)       
SINGAPORE 16.3       (1.9)        1.6         (1.4)        (2.0)       
SLOVAKIA 0.0         (11.1)      (1.7)        (0.6)        (2.9)       
SOUTH AFRICA 3.7        
SOUTH KOREA (15.8)      4.7         1.0         (2.4)        (2.4)       
SPAIN (4.6)        4.4         (1.1)        5.8         2.3         (1.5)        0.4         (1.6)        (2.2)       
SWEDEN (2.0)        7.5         0.9         (0.5)        (1.6)        (3.2)        0.8         (0.6)       
SWITZERLAND (10.9)      (1.2)        (1.5)        (4.0)        (0.9)        2.9         0.6         0.1        
THAILAND (1.2)        (0.8)        (0.8)       
UNITED KINGDOM 1.1         1.4         0.5         (0.4)        (8.6)        (1.3)        2.4         2.3         0.5        
UNITED STATES (0.8)        3.8         (0.8)        3.2         3.7         (1.5)        (1.9)        0.1        
VENEZUELA 4.5         0.5        
AFRICA (11.9)      2.9         4.5         3.9        
ASIA (0.6)        1.8         (0.6)       
EUROPE 17.4       4.0         (1.7)        (1.4)       
LATIN AMERICA 0.9         (0.1)       
MIDDLE EAST 3.6         1.0        
TAX HAVENS (2.1)        (3.5)        (2.2)        (0.2)       